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LABOR LAW AND FREE SPEECH:
THE CURIOUS POLICY OF LIMITED EXPRESSION*
JULIUS GETMAN**
Labor relations is the one area of law in which the policies of the
first amendment have been consistently ignored, reduced, and held to be
outweighed by other interests. A "policy of limited expression" has been
applied to pure speech and symbolic speech, to consumer picketing and
employee boycotts, to political action and to the organizational activi-
ties of both labor and management.' It has been woodenly applied by
the National Labor Relations Board (Board),2 routinely enforced by the
courts of appeals,3 and given its major impetus by the Supreme Court in
a series of opinions notable for their failure to explain, rationalize, dis-
tinguish, or articulate useful standards.' The approach taken in labor
cases is in marked contrast to the Court's traditional commitment to
freedom of expression, to its recent decisions expanding the constitu-
tional protection given to commercial speech,5 and to its recent
landmark decision, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co .,6 finding political
boycotts to be constitutionally protected when undertaken for the cause
of racial equality.
* This Article originally was presented as the Pearl and Lawrence I. Gerber Memorial
Lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law on October 27, 1983.
** William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1953, City College of
New York; LL.B. 1958, LL.M. 1963, Harvard University.
1. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 270 (1973); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980);
see generaly Wimberly & Steckel, AILRB Campaign Laboratory Conditiorns Doctrine and Free Speech
Reviuited, 32 MERCER L. REV. 535 (1981) (discussing past and present Board application of
the labortory conditions doctrine).
2. See generally Wimberly & Steckel, supra note I (same).
3. See, e.g., Soft Drink Workers Union v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Fore-
man & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1954); Sunoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 399
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968) (enforcement denied on other grounds).
4. E.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. NLRB, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2926 (1983); Inter-
national Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575 (1969); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S., 694 (1951).
5. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
6. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYER SPEECH
For employers, the policy of limited expression has its greatest sig-
nificance in the area of representation campaigns. In this area, a series
of Board doctrines,7 regularly enforced by the courts of appeals, limit
the campaign arguments, the method of delivery, and even the tone of
rhetoric that an employer may use.8 The Supreme Court has affirmed
this approach in two remarkable opinions: NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co. 9
and NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. "o The Court, in Exchange Parts, held that
a grant of employment benefits prior to an election was coercive. In
Gissel, the Court upheld the propriety of the Board in finding certain
employer statements to be unfair labor practices and the use of a bar-
gaining order to remedy what it deemed to be serious employer
violations.
The Court in Gissel dealt with an employer who had bargained
with a union prior to a long, economically costly strike which nearly put
the company out of business." When business activities resumed after
the strike had ended, the company began nonunion operations. Years
later, the Teamsters12 conducted an organizing drive and signed up a
majority of the employees. Prior to a Board election, the company presi-
dent conducted a series of talks and meetings in which he discussed the
harmful effects of unionization.
In the Court's words, the company president "particularly empha-
sized the results of the long 1952 strike which he claimed 'almost put our
company out of business.' "13 He also emphasized "that the company
was still on 'thin ice' financially, that the Union's 'only weapon is to
strike,' and that a strike 'could lead to the closing of the plant.' ""4 He
warned the employees "to 'look around Holyoke and see a lot of them
out of business.' "15 During the period immediately before the elections,
the employer made similar statements attacking the union as a "strike
happy outfit"1 6 and stressed the danger to the company from strikes.
7. See inta notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
8. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
9. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
10. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
11. Id. at 587. The company was shut down for three months in 1952 as a result of a
strike with the American Wire Weavers Protective Association. Id.
12. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Building Materials,
Heavy & Highway Construction Employees, Local No. 404, an Affiliate of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. See The Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261, 262 (1967), enforced, 397
F.2d 157 (1968), af'd sub nom. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
13. 395 U.S. at 587-88.
14. Id. at 588 (quoting the employer's pamphlet).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 588.
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The union lost the election. The Board concluded that the em-
ployer's conduct made a fair election impossible because it "reasonably
tended to convey to the employees the belief or impression that selection
of the Union . . .could lead.., to [the closing of the] plant, or to the
transfer of the weaving operation, with the resultant loss of jobs to the
wire weavers.'' The Board also concluded that the employer's actions
foreclosed the possibility of a subsequent fair election" and ordered the
employer to bargain with the union upon request.
Several aspects of this case are particularly notable. First, at no
point did the employer directly threaten to close the plant or take eco-
nomic reprisals in retaliation for the employees' voting for representa-
tion. Indeed, his comments were all premised upon the likelihood of a
union-called strike. (This is typical of the vast majority of Section
8(a)(1) cases.' 9 ) Second, there was no finding that the company presi-
dent was not expressing his honest convictions. Third, the remedy,
which involved reversing the result of an election on the basis of an as-
sumption about the way voters would have behaved in the absence of
any impropriety, has little or no parallel in general election law.
The employer argued that his statements amounted to no more
than an exercise of his first amendment rights of free speech. Rejecting
this contention, the Supreme Court held that the employer's speech con-
tained a threat of reprisal and that the bargaining order was a legiti-
mate technique to remedy its effect.
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of
course, must be made in the context of its labor relations set-
ting. Thus, an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal
rights of the employees to associate freely. . . .And any bal-
ancing of those rights must take into account the economic de-
pendence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship,
to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.2 °
The Court also rejected the argument that a bargaining order was too
severe a remedy for a speech based violation.
17. Sinclair, 164 N.L.R.B. at 267, quotedin NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 589
(1969).
18. Id. at 267, 269.
19. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 8(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). This section
makes it an "unfair labor practice for an employer-() to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees" in the exercise of their rights to organize.
20. 395 U.S. at 617.
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[W]hat is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonperma-
nent, limited relationship between the employer, his economi-
cally dependent employee and his union agent, not the
election of legislators or the enactment of legislation whereby
that relationship is ultimately defined and where the in-
dependent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and
employers as a class freer to talk.2
The Court, in an earlier passage, attempted to minimize the effect of
such a remedy: "There is, after all, nothing permanent in a bargaining
order, and if, after the effects of the employer's acts have worn off, the
employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by filing a
representation petition."
22
On the basis of this analysis, the Court restricted an employer's first
amendment rights to discuss the "effect he believes unionization will
have on his company 21 3 to the making of predictions that are "carefully
phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as
to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control ... 24
Thus, "[c]onveyance of the employer's belief, even though sincere, that
unionization will or may result in the closing of the plant is not a state-
ment of fact unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing
is capable of proof."'25 Responding to the argument that the line be-
tween threat and prediction, thus drawn, is too weak to withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny, the Court commented that, "an employer, who has
control over that relationship and therefore knows it best, . . can easily
make his views known without engaging in 'brinksmanship'. . . . At
the least he can avoid coercive speech simply by avoiding conscious
overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees. "26
In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 2 7 the Court applied similar analysis
21. Id. at 617-18.
22. Id. at 613.
23. Id. at 618.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 618-19.
26. Id. at 620.
27. 375 U.S. 405 (1964). In Exchange Parts, several weeks prior to a Board election, the
company sent its employees a letter which mentioned several new benefits. The letter also
"spoke of 'the Empty Promises of the Union' and 'the Fact that it is the Company that puts things
in your envelope. . . .The Union can't put any of those things in your envelope--on/ the
Company can do that.'" Id. at 407 (quoting Exchange Parts Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 806, 810 (1961),
enforcement denied, 304 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 405 (1964)).
The Union lost the election. The Board, however, concluded that the announcement
of new benefits was meant to induce a vote against the Union and set the election aside.
Exchange Parts Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 806, 807, 811 (1961), enforcement denied, 304 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1962), reo'd, 375 U.S. 405 (1964). The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement in an opinion by
Judge Wisdom which summarized the case as follows:
[T]he critical fact in this case is that. the benefits carried no coercive element; they
1984]
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to the grant or promise of benefits holding that they were coercive be-
cause they would be perceived by employees as an indirect threat:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the
suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not
likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now con-
ferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow
and which may dry up if it is not obliged. 8
This analysis of the impact of an employer promise has been followed by
the Board which on occasion has utilized a statement granting or prom-
ising benefits as the primary basis for issuing a bargaining order under
the authority granted by Gtssel. 9
The conclusions in Gissel and Exchange Parts rest on four basic as-
sumptions; each of which are, in my opinion, counterfactual:
1. Employees are attentive to what the employer says during the
campaign and will, as a result, pick up intimations of reprisal
in statements which might be construed differently by others.
They will be coerced by such intimations to play it safe and
vote against union representation.
2. The installation of a union as bargaining representative is not
comparable to installing a government official who received the
fewest votes.
3. Under these rules, the employer is able adequately to state his
case against unionization.
4. The Board, by virtue of its expertise, is to determine which em-
ployer misconduct will have so lasting an impact that a bar-
gaining order would be more appropriate than a rerun election.
The first and fourth of these assumptions were addressed in the em-
pirical study of union representation elections which I conducted with
Professors Goldberg and Herman. 3' Based on data collected over a two-
were not conditioned upon the employees' relinquishment of any rights. . . . It is
impressive logomachy to turn "allurements" into "coercion" by divining a secret
purpose. It is good, homey, country-lawyer advocacy to argue that a carrot on a
stick may have the same effect on a donkey as a club. But a carrot is not a club.
Labor is not a donkey. Persuasion is not coercion.
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 304 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
28. 375 U.S. at 409.
29. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969), enforced, 436 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971)
(bargaining order predicated on an employer's solicitation and adjustment of grievances);
International Harvester Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 753, 753-54 (1969) (issuing a bargaining order
because "few unfair labor practices [are] so effective in cooling employees' enthusiasm for a
union than the prompt remedy of the grievances which prompted the employee's union inter-
est in the first place").
30. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAw & REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAW & REALITY]. See Getman & Goldberg, The
[VOL. 43:4
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year period under carefully controlled circumstances in thirty-one elec-
tions, we concluded that employees are not particuarly attentive to the
campaign, that perceptions of coercion are unrelated to the actual state-
ments made, and that employees are not thereby persuaded to vote
against representation. Indeed, their perception of threats of reprisal is
highly correlated with votingfor representation. We also found that
Board doctrine concerning the issuance of bargaining orders is totally
unrelated to campaign impact.3 1
The Court's assumption that selection of union representatives is a
minor or casual matter, easily changed by the employees if it is deter-
mined to be undesirable, 2 ignores both the important changes which
come with union representation and the extent to which Board rules
serve to protect stability rather than free choice after a union is installed.
The record suggests that union incumbents are much more likely to be
around after ten years than are their counterparts elected to public
offices.
The Court's assurance that an employer can easily make his views
known without coming close to the brink33 would be convincing if the
Court had explained how the possible harmful effects of unionization
can be legally addressed. In my experience, knowledgeable employer
counsel, desirous of avoiding unfair labor practices, have difficulty with
this wavering line. Perhaps the Court really meant for the employer to
stay away from the issue altogether, but the position that unionization
may lead to plant closings or transfers of work is, after all, not without
its adherents, many of whom base their arguments on respectable mar-
ket theory. The reasons why a union might cause an employer to go out
of business are well explained in Professor Rees' classic work, The Eco-
nomics of Trade Unons .3' Because the argument is based on assumptions
about union behavior, a certain amount of employer discretion is a nec-
essary element for a full and open discussion on the effects of
unionization.
The law currently protects employer discretion with regard to plant
closings in a way that ignores both union rights and employee interests.
An employer may close down in retaliation for a union vote or in re-
Behavioral Assumptions Underlving NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations An Empirical
Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976); Getman, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of
Campaign Tactics. The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1465 (1975).
31. LAW & REALITY, Supra note 30, at 115.
32. See supra text accompanying note 22.
33. See supra text accompanying note 26.
34. A. REES, THE EcONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS (1962). See also NLRB v. Village IX
Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983).
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sponse to a union position expected in collective bargaining without
even discussing the matter with the union. 35 But to refer to those rights
during an organizational campaign would probably be an unfair labor
practice. Thus, the campaign assumes employee ignorance which it is
unlawful to correct.
I am aware that my own conclusions are not free from doubt. The
findings of the Getman-Goldberg-Herman study, in particular, have
been challenged in a variety of publications with a variety of arguments
ranging from gut feelings to sophisticated mathematical analysis.3 6 I do
not urge that our recommendations are entitled to constitutional status;
my point is only that the factual assumptions, on which the attempts to
distinguish between speech in the labor context and speech in other con-
texts are based, are extremely doubtful.
Only the Court's factual assumption about labor relations explains
why normal first amendment protections should not apply to employer
statements ambiguously referring to the harmful consequences of union-
ization. In other contexts the Court has been unwilling to assume that
speech has a coercive or threatening impact.3 7 It has rejected the claims
of government officials to be able to predict the impact of speech on
bystanders.38 It has insisted that calls to violence or threats of harm
must be clearly spelled out and followed by action before characterizing
them as unlawful.39 It has insisted that remedies for unlawful speech be
35. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Weiler, Promises to Keep.- Securing Workers' Rights to Se/f-Orgamization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782-86 (1983). Ross, Afierthoughts on the Short-Lived Experi-
menit i Deregulation of Representation Elections (Book Review), 77 MICH. L. REv. 560 (1979);
Kochan, Legal Nonsense, Empirical Examination and Pohcy Evaluation (Book Review), 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1115 (1977); Peck, NLRB Election Law (Book Review), 53 U. WASH. L. REV. 197 (1977);
Shapiro, Why Do Voters Vote? (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J. 1532-(1977); Eames, An Analsis of
the Unton Voting Sudy from a Trade-Uniomt's Point of Vew (Book Review), 28 STAN. L. REv.
1181 (1976); Miller, The Getiman, Goldberg and Herman Questions (Book Review), 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1163 (1976). But see generally Getman, Goldberg & Brett, Union Representation Elec-
tions: Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critcs, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 564 (1981).
37. Eg., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-20 (1982); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). But cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530-32 (1945) (similar principle in labor context); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
104-05 (1940) (same).
38. Eg., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969). Even when treating government
restrictions on expression with great deference, the modern Court has required a "clear and
present danger" of violent reaction. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951).
39. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973) (words not intended and not likely to produce imminent disorder are not punishable).
Historically, the Court has been quick to find that the expression of unpopular or radical
groups is incitement. Eg., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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limited in such a way as to protect whatever legitimate message the
speech might contain. And it has rejected the idea that the identity or
position of the speaker may justify regulation. 4' The Court has also con-
sistently rejected remedies for unlawful speech based upon the assump-
tion of an irremediably harmful consequence.
The Court in Gz'ssel referred with evident approval to the Board's
laboratory conditions doctrine. 41 This doctrine has included a variety of
rules obviously inconsistent with general first amendment policies. For
example, elections have been set aside for minor injections of racism into
a campaign, 42 for statements suggesting the futility of voting for the
union,4 3 for showing films deemed by the Board to be misleading and
inconsistent with sober and reflective thought,44 and for discussions of
40. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court stated:
[Glovernment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds ac-
ceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views... Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, gov-
ernment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.
Id. at 96. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (applying compelling state interest
standard to denial of forum to student religious group); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1976) (prior restraint on the use of a public forum must be accompa-
nied by procedural safeguards).
41. The laboratory conditions doctrine was first announced in General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124 (1948):
Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will
sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not con-
stitute an unfair labor practice. . . . In election proceedings, it is the Board's func-
tion to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the
employees.
Id. at 127-28. Although the doctrine fell into disfavor under the Eisenhower Board, see I THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 311 (2d ed. 1983), the Board reaffirmed General Shoe in Dal-Tex
Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
In the wake of the Getman-Goldberg-Herman study, see LAW & REALITY, supra note
17 and accompanying text, the NLRB has been inconsistent in its adherence to the laboratory
conditions standard. The doctrine was partially abandoned in Shopping Kart Food Mkts.,
228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). Shopping Kart was overturned in General Knit of California, 239
N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), but was reaffirmed in Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127
(1982). This uncertainty has created some consternation in the courts. See, e.g., Mosey Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
42. E.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
43. E.g., Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
44. For some time, the Board prohibited the showing of "And Women Must Weep," an
anti-union propaganda film distributed by the National Right to Work Committee during
election campaigns. Eg., Spartus Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 134 (1972), enforced on other grounds, 471
F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1973); Storkline Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 875 (1963); Plochman & Harrison-
Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962). Apparently prompted by rejections of this
position by the courts of appeals, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 155 (1976),
the Board reversed itself. Litho Press of San Antonio, 211 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1974), enforced 512
1984]
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unionism, containing no hint of reprisal, held either in the employee's
home or in the office of someone high enough in the company for the
office to be considered the "locus of final authority.'"4"
The Court's switch from the marketplace to the laboratory consti-
tutes more than a casual change in metaphor. The images represent two
significant views of speech. One recognizes the value of diversity of ex-
pression and the ability of the hearer, as consumer, to make an intelli-
gent choice; the other suggests the need for purity, the possibility of
precise measurement, and the ability to devise adequate remedies. The
laboratory conditions doctrine rests ultimately upon the assumption
that free choice is fragile-that it will be undermined by the type of
robust debate encouraged by the first amendment in other areas.4 6
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND UNION ACTIVITY
Unions have claimed first amendment protection for two tradi-
tional tactics: picketing and boycotts. In its initial picketing decision
holding unconstitutional an Alabama statute that prohibited picketing
for the purpose of furthering a boycott, the Court held that peaceful
labor picketing was a protected form of expression.4 7
The health of the present generation and of those as yet un-
born may depend upon these matters, and the practices in a
single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole
region and affect widespread systems of marketing. The mer-
est glance at state and federal legislation on the subject demon-
strates the force of the argument that labor relations are not
matters of mere local or private concern.4"
The Court's decisions after Thornhil v. Alabama, however, reflect a
constant retreat from the idea that picketing is a form of protected
speech dealing with important societal issues. Because most of the cases
F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Sab Harmon Industries, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 953 (1980) (show-
ing of "The Springfield Gun" ruled unobjectionable, based on Litho Press).
45. Eg., General Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
46. Eg., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-
62 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776-83 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). See also Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing nature of
the first amendment's grant of public access to trials). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101-02 (1940) (applying same principle in labor context).
47. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
48. Id. at 103. See Note, Labor Acketing and Commerical Speech. Free Enterprise Values in the
Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 954-57 (1982); Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the
First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1486-88 (1982).
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have involved picketing, or the threat of picketing, to force an employer
to recognize a minority union, picketing has been perceived as a tech-
nique of coercion as much as an expression of ideas.49 This concept was
expressed most famously by Justice Douglas in Bake.y &Pastiy Drivers &
Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl:5 ° "Picketing by an organized group is more
than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since
the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or an-
other, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated." 5 1
The meaning of this passage, which has been repeatedly quoted in
labor picketing cases,5 2 is far from clear. The first clause, referring to
patrol of a locality, suggests that the special vice of picketing is the phys-
ical deterrent inherent in maintaining a line that people will think it
risky to cross. But this analysis rests upon the existence of certain facts
which are not always present, which indeed have been notably absent in
subsequent picketing cases decided by the Board or the courts. The sec-
ond clause is confusing: Does it refer to physical coercion, to the idea
that picketing calls for categorical response by dedicated union mem-
bers and those subject to union discipline, or to the assumption that
people will respond to a picket line according to their views of labor
rather than to the message contained on any sign? If it refers to fear, it
is wrong, for fear is not a necessary aspect of all conduct characterized as
picketing; if it refers to the response of unionists, it fails to distinguish
picketing from other union authorized inducements to boycott such as
leaflets, newspaper ads, or speeches.53 The fact that people might re-
49. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, rh'g de-
nied, 354 U.S. 945 (1957); Local Union No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers v.
Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Building Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzman, 339 U.S. 532
(1950); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). Cf. Hughes v. Supe-
rior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (state may prohibit picketing aimed at persuading merchants
to hire minorities); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (state may
prohibit picketing of wholesaler who deals with non-union peddlers). But cf. Senn v. Tile
Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) (fourteenth amendment does not prohibit state from au-
thorizing organizational picketing).
50. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
51. Id. at 776-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
52. E.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local, 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,
Local 760 ("Tree Fruits"), 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); id. at 93 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289, rh'g
denied, 354 U.S. 945 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950); Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949).
53. It is not clear in many of the Court's opinions whether the true vice of the union
activity being regulated is the use of picketing or the use of a boycott to achieve some im-
proper purpose. These opinions tend to conflate the two points, although it is clear that, for
some justices, the existence of something called picketing is deemed of crucial constitutional
19841
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spond to picketing in terms of their general attitude towards labor is not
different from the fact that people respond to many forms of expression
in terms of their own views or the causes with which the expression is
associated. Other forms of communication that are constitutionally pro-
tected, such as wearing an arm band, refusing to salute the flag, or hold-
ing a Ku Klux Klan rally, may elicit a similar response.
Cases raising the constitutional status of picketing typically have
involved its use to promote either a consumer boycott or a concerted
refusal by employees of a secondary employer to work on the goods of a
party with whom the union has a dispute. In refusing to protect picket-
ing, the opinions rely on both the government's right to regulate picket-
ing and its right to prohibit the spread of strikes and boycotts to
secondary employers. Thus, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001,5 the Court upheld a ban on peaceful picketing aimed at convinc-
ing consumers not to purchase a struck product. It dismissed the first
amendment claim in a short, conclusory paragraph focusing upon the
purpose of the picketing: "Congress may prohibit secondary picket-
ing. ... Such picketing spreads labor discord by coercing a neutral
party to join the fray. . . . [A] prohibition on 'picketing in furtherance
of [such] unlawful objectives' [does] not offend the First Amendment."55
In International Longshoremen's Association v. A/lied International, Inc.,5 6 the
Court had little problem with the regulation of what it deemed a secon-
dary boycott even though there was an absence of picketing: "We have
consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing. . . is protected
activity under the First Amendment. . . . It would seem even clearer
that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still less
consideration under the First Amendment."5 7 The unfair labor practice
finding which the Court upheld included both the refusal of the long-
shoremen to handle Soviet goods and the inducement of such conduct
by their president.5 8
Because the Court does not explain the basis upon which the labor
dimension. Thus, both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun
in Retail Store Employees Union, make arguments directed primarily to the protection of neutral
employers and do not focus on the special nature of picketing. But the concurring opinion by
Justice Stevens claims, without citation, that "the principal reason why handbills containing
the same message are so much less effective than labor picketing is that the former depend
entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
55. Id. at 616 (quoting Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)).
56. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
57. Id. at 226-27.
58. Id., at 214. International Longshoreman's Association President, Thomas Gleason,
"ordered ILA members to stop handling cargoes arriving from or destined for the Soviet
Union." Id.
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regulation is upheld, one might conclude that the Court has adopted a
general policy denying constitutional protection to picketing and boy-
cotts were it not for the unanimous opinion in NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co." Clairborne Hardware arose out of a boycott of white owned
businesses by black residents of Claiborne County, Mississippi. The boy-
cott was conducted in order to secure compliance with specific demands
including "the desegregation of all public schools and public facilities,
the hiring of black policemen, public improvements in black residential
areas, selection of blacks for jury duty, integration of bus stations so that
blacks could use all facilities, . . . and an end to verbal abuse by law
enforcement officers."6 The leaders of the boycott enlisted participants
by threats and acts of violence; Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the
NAACP, delivered a speech in which he stated that "boycott violators
would be 'disciplined' by their own people and warned that the sheriff
could not sleep with boycott violators at night."'" Because the boycott
leaders used force, violence, and threats, the Mississippi Supreme Court
found that the boycott was a tortious interference with the merchant's
business.6 2 The court did not find a violation of the state secondary
boycott law only because that statute was enacted two years after the
boycott began.
63
Holding that "the nonviolent elements of petitioners' activities are
entitled to the protection of the First Amendment, 6 4 the Supreme
Court reversed. Although the Court did not state explicitly whether the
refusal to patronize was protected as "speech, assembly, association, and
petition,"" its discussion strongly suggests that the boycott itself was an
aspect of the right of association. Moreover, the Court noted that the
boycott was furthered by speech and by picketing, which, citing Thorn-
hill, it described as being "ordinarily safeguarded by the First
Amendment."66
The Court rejected the argument that the boycotter's use of vio-
59. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
60. Id. at 889.
61. Id. at 902.
62. Id. at 893-97. For the text of the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion, see NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So.2d 1290 (1980). The Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
If any of these factors-force, violence, or threats--is present, then the boycott is
illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political, social or
other. All of these factors are here present, and the boycott was illegally operated
and we do not need to examine into its type, whether primary or other.
Id. at 1301, quoted n part in 458 U.S. at 895.
63. 458 U.S. at 894 (citing Claiborne Hardware, 393 So. 2d at 1300).
64. Id. at 915 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 911.
66. Id. at 909 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940)).
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lence subjected them to state regulation. Citing labor cases dealing with
federal preemption, it limited the state's jurisdiction to matters directly
and specifically related to the threat and use of violence. 67 In delineat-
ing the state's limited role, the Court found that Evers' speeches were
beyond the state's power to regulate even though his comments included
an implicit threat: "If that language had been followed by acts of vio-
lence, a substantial question would be presented whether Evers could be
held liable."'  Because no violence immediately followed Evers' speech,
however, the Court found it to be protected by a " 'profound national
commitment' that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide open.' "69 In lines likely to be oft-quoted, it stated that
[s]trong and effective extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be
nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate must
be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emo-
tional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When
such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be re-
garded as protected speech.7 °
CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF LIMITED EXPRESSION
Both unions and employers have cause to be confused and of-
fended. Why is their speech and speech-related conduct judged by such
different standards? Why is the policy of robust debate so rarely men-
tioned and replaced instead by the "delicate balance," the "laboratory,"
the policy of "peacefully resolving disputes," and the easy assumption of
coercion? The majority opinion in Claibome Hardware offers an explana-
tion. In labor cases, the regulation of speech is permissible because of
the "strong governmental interest in certain forms of economic regula-
tion, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect on the
rights of speech and association." 7 Thus, "secondary boycotts and pick-
eting by labor unions may be prohibited."7 2 Such activity is distin-
67. Relying upon the rulings in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), and United Construction Work-
ers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), the Court held that "[w]hile the
State legitimately may impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, it may not
award compensation for the consequences of nonviolent, protected activity. Only those losses
proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered." 458 U.S. at 918.
68. Id. at 928.
69. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 912.
72. Id. (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees' Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617-18
(1980), and International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224
(1982)).
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guishable from that found in cases like Clazborne Hardware:
While States have broad power to regulate economic activity,
we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful polit-
ical activity such as that found in the boycott in this case. This
Court has recognized that expression on public issues "has al-
ways rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."
73
The distinction drawn between the economic activity involved in
the labor cases and the political activity relating to public issues is ana-
lytically unsound, historically inaccurate, and culturally myopic. Of the
boycotts presented to the Court, the longshoremen's boycott seems most
clearly political because it lacked the intermediate goal of economic
gain for the participants that was present in Claiborne Hardware. But, far
from aiding the longshoremen's constitutional claim, the lack of an in-
termediate goal was viewed as a factor further justifying regulation:
[Ilt is "more rather than less objectionable that a national la-
bor union has chosen to marshal against neutral parties the
considerable powers derived . . .under the federal labor laws
in aid of a random political objective far removed from what
has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate
union activity.
74
What distinguishes the retail store employees' appeal to the public
for support, when picketing Safeco Title Insurance, from the public is-
sue that the Court recognized in the Clairborne Hardware boycott? Both
cases involved appeals aimed at achieving immediate economic benefits
for a limited group, and both appeals were ultimately premised on a
broader goal of redistributing economic benefits: to blacks in one case,
to labor in the other. To suggest that one goal is of greater public con-
cern than the other is to view labor through the Court's artifically cre-
ated prism by which collective bargaining becomes dissociated from any
broader, nobler, more enduring purpose.7 5
The Court in Claiborne Hardware characterized the boycott as in-
cluding "elements of criminality and elements of majesty, ' 76 but there is
no recognition of nobility for the longshoremen who risked losing their
jobs to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather, there is a
73. Id. a- 913.
74. InternationalLongshoremen'sAss'n, 456 U.S. at 225-26 (1982) (quoting Allied Int'l, Inc. v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)).
75. For cases exemplifying this view of collective bargaining, see generally id.; First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Chemical Workers Local I v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
76. 458 U.S. at 888.
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tone of annoyance that the union butted into areas outside of its legiti-
mate interests. The Court seems to appreciate the enobling features of
racial protest but to view the protest of labor with unease. Yet, what
cause has been a greater source of human commitment, heroism, polit-
ical agitation, or scholarly inquiry? What cause has been more often the
subject of literature, meeting, song, and drama in all of history than the
idea of working class solidarity? Clatbome Hardware and International
Longshoremen-s Association can be distinguished by focusing on the imme-
diate objective in one case and the long range objective in the other.
Moreover, the concept of coercion is treated differently in the two cases.
In International Longshoremen's Association it refers to the boycott itself; in
Clatborne Hardware, it refers only to the manner in which people are
enlisted.
The opinion in International Longshoremen's Associ'ation emphasizes the
power that unions derive from the labor laws, but the Court did not
explain why the system of labor regulation makes a union boycott less
permissible. In Claiborne Hardware, the Court did not consider the possi-
bility that the complex and comprehensive legislation aimed at combat-
ing racial discrimination made that boycott less worthy of protection.
In First Nlatonal Bank v. Belloti, the Court rejected the claim that a cor-
poration's first amendment rights may be limited because corporations
are creatures of the law.7 7 It concluded that the crucial variable in first
amendment analysis is nature of the speech, not the speaker. If this
analysis applies to corporations, which owe their very existence to stat-
utes making them more economically advantageous than other forms of
business, it certainly should apply to unions, which are sometimes pro-
tected and frequently restricted by legal doctrine.
It might be argued that the special feature of labor law that makes
restricting union speech legitimate is the doctrine of exclusivity which
allows a recognized union to speak for all employees in a bargaining
unit. 78 But current secondary boycott rules draw no distinction between
incumbent and non-incumbent unions or between appeals to workers,
which might gain strength from the doctrine of exclusivity, and appeals
to customers, which do not. Moreover, the doctrine of exclusivity does
not give a union the right to insist that its members participate in a
boycott. Even if secondary activity is held to be within the first amend-
ment, such activity will not, thereby, be protected against employer re-
sponse: employees who engage in it may be legally discharged. As a
77. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775-86 (1978).
78. Cf. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 225-26 (1982); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, rh'g dented, 433 U.S. 915 (1977); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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practical matter, no-strike clauses will prohibit the vast majority of in-
cumbent unions from engaging in secondary strikes. Finally, for every
union whose power is increased by the doctrine of exclusivity there are
several for whom the doctrine has functioned as an insuperable barrier
to recognized status and, hence, makes them too weak to participate in a
strike.7"
The other bases suggested by the Court's opinions also fail to offer a
persuasive reason for distinguishing labor boycotts from political boy-
cotts. Although most union activity is aimed at influencing private par-
ties rather than a governmental entity, that was not true of the
longshoremen in International Longshoremen's Association. Moreover, the
Court in Aboodo. Detroit Board of Education8 ° rejected the idea that efforts
to influence the government have a claim to first amendment protection
greater than efforts to influence the citizenry.8"
CONCLUSION
One is forced to conclude that the Court's special treatment of la-
bor relations is based on something other than constitutional text, ana-
lytic precision, or a commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis. Can the
policy of limited expression be explained as an aspect of labor relations
common to both employers and unions? At first blush, the cases dealing
with employer speech are far different from those dealing with picketing
and union boycotts. One set of cases involves pure speech or speech plus
conduct and employees as victims. In the cases dealing with picketing
and boycotts, the employees are seen as aggressors. The same employees
whose timidity in the face of suggested reprisal is the justification for
protective governmental regulation become, once organized, intimida-
tors whose picket line, no matter how peaceful, interferes with the free
choice of customers and other workers.
Nevertheless, the cases have several common themes. The most ob-
vious theme is the oft-mentioned "delicate balance" of labor law regula-
tion by which each restriction that is imposed upon one party is used, in
the name of neutrality, to justify a limitation upon the other. The cases
also manifest a common, stereotyped, and paternalistic vision of workers
79. Over the past 30 years, unions have been consistently losing much of the strength that
they enjoyed "[i]n their halycon days of the early 1940's .... ." Weiler, supra note 51, at
1775. Professor Weiler's study shows "that the number of employees successfully organized
each year has dropped from 750,000 to fewer than 200,000." Id. at 1776. While the union
victory rate in certification elections was 74% in 1950, in 1980 it was only 48%. Id. If the
employees do not strongly support the unions, it is unlikely that, once organized, they will
support a union-called strike.
80. 431 U.S. 209, rh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
81. Id. at 230-32.
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as people whose decisions are not made on the basis of ideas and persua-
sion but on the basis of fear, coercion, and discipline. It is as though the
Court imagines labor relations to be a realm in which the free expression
of ideas is unimportant because they are not the basis upon which ac-
tions are taken, votes cast, or picket lines observed. Labor relations is
also a realm in which the limited value of speech is thought to be out-
weighed by the harmful consequences that would follow from the vigor-
ous application of first amendment policies: If employer speech were
not carefully regulated, employees would be constantly coerced into vot-
ing against unionization. If peaceful picketing and boycotts were
treated as forms of protected expression, industrial disputes would be
spread willy-nilly throughout society causing economic loss and physical
damage, enmeshing neutrals, 2 and coercing both employers and
employees.
To the extent that the Court's opinions are ultimately based upon
such a vision, they are attributable to the ignorance of labor relations
that afflicts both the Board and the courts. If the Court would recognize
employer's free speech rights in organizational campaigns by holding
that ambiguous statements could not be treated as threats,8 3 campaign
behavior and outcome would change little if at all. 4 Currently if the
properform of words is chosen, permissible employer speech is practi-
cally indistinguishable in content and impact from the statements out-
lawed by Gt'se. 5 Moreoever, for tactical reasons, employers are
unlikely to use flagrant threats of reprisal. Even employer representa-
tives who are not motivated by ethical considerations generally recog-
nize that threats may convince employees that they need a union.
Those who do utilize fear almost always prefer to leave some ambiguity
about the way in which harm will occur. Employees who get the
message of employer retaliation are not motivated thereby to vote
against unionization. 6
If union picketing and boycotts were evaluated by the standards of
Claiborne Hardware, little would be lost and much possibly gained. The
secondary boycott rules which would be overturned are highly techni-
cal, economically irrational, and rarely applied against strikes of signifi-
cant economic impact. Because of its technicality, ambiguous drafting,
82. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
83. Such was the view so clearly expressed by Judge Wisdom in Exchange Parts, 304 F.2d
at 375, reprinted supra note 27.
84. See NLRB v. Village IX Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983).
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and confused interpretation, secondary boycott law more resembles an
intellectual rubble heap piled haphazardly with conflicting rules riddled
with exceptions, doctrines randomly applied, and terms given different
meaning in similar cases than it does a delicate balance; anything a
union might do can be justified by one doctrine and prohibited by an-
other. Treating union boycotts as forms of expression would eliminate
technicality and confusion and would not have serious economic effect:
1. Such boycotts would be rarely employed-they are cumber-
some, expensive tactics that most weak unions can not afford,
and that strong unions do not need because they can cut off the
product at its source.
2. For most incumbent unions, a concerted response to another
union's dispute would be unlawful, even without section
8(b)(4),87 because it would violate their no-strike pledge.
3. Concerted support outside the construction industry would
generally be difficult to obtain, even without a no-strike pledge,
because it would make the secondary union members vulnera-
ble to discharge."8
4. The concept of neutrality in secondary boycott cases is an am-
biguous one. Unions rarely, if ever, seek to apply pressure
against an employer who has not supported or chosen to deal
with the primary target.
5. Most secondary boycotts take place in the construction indus-
try. But the economics of this industry are such that a policy
allowing wider appeals than are currently permitted would still
fail to achieve the economic impact on neutral employers
which is easily achieved by a primary strike in other industries.
6. The cases in which a secondary activity seems unfair and un-
conscionable are almost always cases in which it is being used
to obtain recognition improperly. 9 Such activity could and
87. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)
(1976). Section 8(b)(4) regulates secondary and primary activity involving certain prohibited
means or objectives.
88. A somewhat unique situation exists in the construction industry:
If the general contractor and the subcontractor are viewed as the same employer, or
at the very least as occupying some sort of ally status, then the union's pressure
creates no problem from a legal standpoint. The union, in demanding that the
general contractor not hire a nonunion subcontractor, can be viewed as merely put-
ting pressure on the offending (primary) employer, the general contractor.
J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN, JR. & E. SILVERSTEIN, 1 LABOR RELA-
TIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A COURSE BOOK 751 (1978).
89. See, e.g. , NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v.
Wohl, 315 U.S. 759 (1942). See also Labor Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act
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should continue to be unlawful.
Because so little is understood about the real impact of secondary
boycott laws and union organizing regulations, and because the Court is
lacking in labor expertise, it seems to shrink from the consequences of
robust debate and freedom of association in labor relations in ways it
would recognize as shameful in other contexts.
§ 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976) (making it an unfair labor practice for a union to
picket or threaten to picket where the object "is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees").
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